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De-Legalisation in Britain in the 1980s
We have chosen to address the issue of 'de-legalisation'1 by breaking 
up some common understandings and by reconstituting the argument 
concerning more or less 'law' as matters of constitutionality. We shall 
adopt the view that most debates about regulation, de-regulation, 
privatisation and the like are theoretically inadequate and that instead 
we should address and synthesise problems of legitimation, legal theory 
and systems building for the better conduct of rational discourse. Whether 
this design makes sense for the other countries of Western Europe we pass 
over at this juncture but have no doubt that in Britain this is the agenda 
which ought to recommend itself to the contemporary public lawyer.
We have long taken the view that law is a series of socially necessary 
tasks to be performed in any given organisational framework (Llewellyn 
1940, Lewis 1981). Procedures for the resolution of grievances, for 
planning and monitoring, for describing the legitimate anatomy of groups 
(their constitutions) are necessary conditions of social intercourse. On 
that level then, to talk about 'more or less' law is to contradict oneself 
and to engage in riddles. This is sometimes obscured by the practice of 
sanctifying one particular historical form of law, 'the high bourgeois' or 
gesellschaft form, and relegating all others.
It is at this point that the question of legitimation arises. Which 
procedures for performing these necessary tasks are collectively 
acceptable and which not? This is the problem of constitutionality which 
is so characteristically ignored in Britain by lawyers and political 
scientists alike. Because Britain has no 'foundation document', no 'ark 
of the covenant' the tendency has grown up of identifying "the 
constitution" with a descriptive series of pragmatic working practices
1'De-legalisation' was the theme for a seminar series at the European 





























































































which habit of mind and tendency do the practitioners of this art no 
intellectual credit whatsoever. More recently some scholars have 
implicitly attacked this practice for its tendency to obscure the 
realities of operational public power (see e.g. Daintith 1984, Middlemas 
1979). However, even the work of Daintith, much more perceptive than that 
of most British public lawyers, has so far failed to pursue its own 
internal theoretical logic. Thus, if it is both useful and legitimate to 
trace the intricate webs of government through 'dominium' as he describes 
it (the power of the purse, the contracts, the concessions, the franchise 
etc) then we must be told why. It is the issue of legitimacy which lies 
at the heart of this problem for, like Daintith, we shall wish accurately 
to explain the workings of our constitution which cannot be a matter of 
subjective preference (pace Jennings 1959, 37). In doing so we shall ex 
necessitate be describing legitimate public power (or identifying 
non-constitutional or illegitimate behaviour) and it is difficult to see 
how legitimate public power can be identified, defended or even 
constructed without public debate. Raw public power is of course a 
different matter but the very concept of legitimation imports a public 
discussion of parameters, even if the discussion marks off some behaviour 
as no-go areas. But it is the discussion which will justify the 
exceptions. We regard this claim as having application to all 
legitimation debates but in Britain the particular claims relating to 
representative democracy, to the common law and to non-arbitrariness locks 
exposure and openness into the very notion of public life. They are 
locked into the notion of public power and therefore into the cons­
titution. And what is the handmaiden of openness unless it be some form




























































































be that we should observe to see if in some sense the public activity 
passes muster? Here we are at the heart of the dilemmas which suffuse any 
serious debate about the British Constitution.
In a forthcoming book (Lewis and Harden 1985) we argue that to expose 
our constitution adequately we must turn our cultural claims (e.g. the 
rule of law) in on themselves and draw out their implications, thereby 
exposing immanent categories. This "immanent critique" we argue reveals a 
constitution based on the twin premises of openness and accountability. 
Any other treatment which affects to describe the British Constitution is 
likely to be operating on an agenda of hidden values and will fail to 
carry either consensual or philosophical conviction.
The modern British State (see e.g. Jessop 1982) is a typically complex 
modern welfare state where socio-economic processes are extraordinarily 
dense and where government is no longer simply concerned with facilitating 
the market and protecting property rights.
"The economic activities of private entities are regulated to varying 
degrees; the extent and visibility of the socialization of their 
formerly "private" conduct depends upon the regulatory mechanism 
employed. Moreover the state has gone into the business of supplying 
primary goods and services (including protection against market risks) 
to its citizens.
Given that the state has become in significant respects both the 
regulator and the competitor of private economic concerns, the 
interesting questions are who or what controls its expanded activities 
and by what power or authority does he do so" (Austin 1982, 153).
To paraphrase Habermas, we need therefore now to be concerned with 
which organisational structures and which discussion and decision 
mechanisms can produce legitimate outcomes (Habermas 1979). We agree 




























































































we should be concerned to produce procedurally legitimate outcomes which 
depend upon concrete social and political conditions, on information and 
informed and rational debate involving a hard look at policy alternatives. 
We have argued elsewhere (Lewis and Harden 1984) that in Britain the 
traditional parliamentary claims for overall legitimation fail to carry 
any real weight or conviction; that to borrow a phrase from an American 
source, the electorate "buys representation in bulk-form" (Choper 1980). 
We have argued, in agreeing with a former Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, that traditional assumptions concerning Cabinet government are 
now no longer sustainable and that the major locus of public power in 
Britain is focussed around a federation of the great departments of state 
in conjunction with their client groups (Ashford 1981). Given that 
Britain has no federal constitution nor developed principles of public law 
constituting a rechsstaat (Dyson 1980) we are desparately short on 
mechanisms which are directed to produce legitimate outcomes through 
rational political choice and discourse.
The separation of law and politics
Part of the difficulty in encouraging constitutional lawyers in Britain to 
engage in institution-building through law in order to assist in 
delivering on constitutional claims and expectations is that the "rule of 
law" paradigm irrationally separates out law from politics. This 
"virtual obsession" was largely, though by no means exclusively, a product 
of nineteenth century history.
"By creating a neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine and 
legal reasoning free from what was thought to be dangerous and 
unstable redistributive tendencies of democratic politics, legal 
thinkers hoped to temper the problem of the "tyranny of the majority". 
Just as nineteenth-century political economy elevated the market to 




























































































supposedly neutral and apolitical basis, so too private law came to be 
understood as a neutral system for facilitating voluntary market 
transactions and vindicating injuries to private rights. The 
hostility to statutes expressed by nineteenth century judges and legal 
thinkers reflected the view that state regulation of private relations 
was a dangerous and unnatural public intrusion into a system based on 
private rights" (Horwitz 1982, 130).
Given that the thrust of this paper is towards arguing for a reasoned 
decision-making process through a revised concept of law, then the 
barriers which define the spheres of influence of law, administration and 
politics must be broken down lest we hinder the deployment of resources 
necessary for rational and efficient policy-making. We agree with K. C. 
Davis that "the danger of tyranny or injustice lurks in unchecked power, 
not in blended power" (1958, 30), though we must reiterate our commitment 
to the broader Llewellynesque, socially necessary concept of law. This 
locks the legal and political processes into each other without actually 
erasing the boundaries between them. Legal institutions, reformed and 
redesigned, can act, indeed should act, in the absence of other 
legitimation devices, to increase the competence of policy-making 
processes, to assist the business of collective cognition and learning
(Unger 1983). We are happy to employ this paraphrase of a well-respected*
statement:
"As a political actor [government] assumes responsibility for 
deciding what ends are to be pursued and what resources it is prepared 
to commit in dealing with problems such as pollution control or 
discrimination in employment... But government must then proceed, as 




























































































public ends will be furthered. In principle, ... these institutions 
[should be] designed to bring maximum objectivity to the elaboration 
of public policy ..." (Nonet and Selznick 1979, 112).
In other words we are not seeking to replace politics by law but to 
harness legal institutions to the exploration and facilitation of 
policy-making so that the optimum conditions for political choice are 
created. These conditions for political choice are ultimately 
constitutional matters of a high order. They also impinge upon the nature 
and legitimate extent of public action so that we shall have to relate 
these problems of constitutionality or legitimacy to the vital question of 
the public/private divide, first in general terms and then in terms 
specifically related to our immanent critique of the British Constitution. 
Constitutionality: the public/private divide
Constitutionality, the legitimate atmosphere for public action, 
naturally poses questions concerning the existence and/or desirability of 
marking out the boundaries between the public and private spheres. 
Whatever constitutes the public sphere, it is clear that action within it 
should accord with settled constitutional principles, specifically in 
relation to procedural matters. As to the substantive behaviour that, 
unless one adopts some version of natural law thinking, (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 1983) is very much a "local" or contingent issue. The public 
sphere’s relation to private behaviour, varying over time and space, time 
and place, must, we would urge, be equally characterised by the same 
settled principles. Given that these, in Britain certainly and most 
compellingly in the U.S.A., must be constituted by canons of openness and 
accountability we ought to be able to map out the relationships, the 
tensions between the boundary fences, and the degree of compenetration 




























































































This has never been systematically attempted by British constitutional 
lawyers thereby ensuring that much essentially public behaviour has gone 
unscrutinised, at least in an overt institutional sense. For present 
purposes we are prepared to pass over what ought to be characterised as 
the irreducible core of 'private' action (though on this point see Gewirth 
1978) and to marginalise the civil liberties component of an 'immanent'set 
of British constitutional claims in favour of our central constitutional 
axiom or convention; viz. parliamentary omnicompetence. This axiom is now 
in effect reduced to the realpolitik of executive omnicompetence so that 
in constitutional theory at least, ministers may make private business 
public business. There is no area of social life where the public writ 
cannot 'constitutionally' run. Now from moment to moment the sociological 
progress of the public writ could and should be traced to gauge the 
compenetration of public and private and to provide an evaluation of that 
state of affairs. We argue that legal institutions in particular are 
defective in failing to bripfhg the relationships to light, and would 
identify in particular the general failure to expose the informal 
relationships between ministers and 'private' actors, a constant theme of 
this paper. However, above and beyond this failure we can trace a more 
general intellectual concealment of the symbiosis between public and 
private interests.
In the classic liberal state the clear distinction between public and 
private was crucial to its legitimacy. The private sphere was supreme 
while the public was primarily charged with facilitating the activities of 
the private sphere.
"The public sphere was ostensibly operated according to democratic 
principles; the hierarchy and dominations that characterized the 





























































































The corollary was that legal thought was concerned to create a clear 
separation between constitutional, criminal and regulatory law - public 
law - and the law of private transactions - torts, contracts, property and 
commercial law (Horwitz 1982, Atiyah 1979). What is not always 
appreciated, however, is that this development was historically specific 
and by no means characterised English law over a long historical period. 
This according to Sir William Holdsworth was in no small measure due to a 
legislative surrender to the economic proposals of Adam Smith and his 
successors. Holdsworth has reminded us that a very detailed regulatory 
regime characterised much of British commerce and industry during the 
early part of the eighteenth century; regulations regarding the treatment 
of apprentices, the payment of wages, for the settlement of disputes 
between masters and servants in a wide variety of trades, and so on. Only 
gradually was this regimen dissolved with inevitable implications for the 
nascent trade union movement whose relationship with government was to 
cause further confounding of the state/society divide in its turn and 
indeed to continue so to do up to the present day (Holdsworth 1938, 
Vol.XI, 518). However the "immutable laws of capital" seemed to make it 
necessary for regulation to be kept at a minimum (Carson 1982, 302), even 
though when occasion demanded the public and private streams commingled as 
witness the injection of private capital into 'public' utilities with the 
state guaranteeing limited liability (Davies 1983, 33; Horwitz 1977, 
110-114). Indeed it now seems clear that private power began to become 
increasingly indistinguishable from public power precisely at the moment, 
late in the nineteenth century when large-scale concentration became the 
norm. These very concentrations became to a large extent the cause of 





























































































As has often been remarked, the state has over the course of much of 
this century imposed upon itself the solving of market failures. According 
to this analysis its very legitimacy depends upon curbing abuses of the 
market while guaranteeing the formal conditions for market behaviour.
"This dual and precarious legitimacy of the modern welfare state leads 
to a dual role of the law; law still serves to organise markets in 
order to keep them running and efficient. It also takes over 
purposive functions by making markets instruments for fulfilling 
government-proclaimed rights. There is an inherent dualism in modern 
law which in the Weberian tradition was described as coexistence, of 
formal and substantive law, of conditional and purpose programming, 
the latter always being at odds with and structurally weaker than the 
former" (Reich 1983).
A different perspective on the issue of compenetration is provided by 
viewing "the public interest" in terms of interest - group pluralism. In 
this interpretation legitimacy is afforded by some version of law as 
providing the conditions for a market version of the public interest but 
with organised interest groups as the competitors and the political 
process as the "market" (Horwitz 1982, Stewart 1976). Although this has 
become heavily institutionalised in the United States it is, as we have 
argued (Lewis and Harden 1984) "networked" in the British political 
process in a largely informal way. Whether interest groups can actively 
contribute to supplementing the formal conditions of democracy in the 
liberal welfare state is another matter (Dahl and Lindblom 1976).
It has to be said that although in Britain institutional machinery for 
moderating competition between interests which seek to capture or 
privatise part of the state machinery is very underdeveloped, the 
phenomenon itself is not. The exploration of North Sea Oil is a case in 




























































































co-option of offshore safety into the broader generic machinery of onshore 
safety administration found themselves in competition with the Department 
of Energy itself which was being pushed by national and international oil 
interests to give higher priority to the requirements of commercial 
production (Carson 1982, 297). Much the same set of tensions have 
traditionally operated in relation to television broadcasting and much 
more recently in relation to the proposals for cable, a matter to which we 
shall revert. However, to add terminological confusions to those of 
substance it is interesting to note that the Hunt Committee in its Report 
on the development of cable systems constantly refers to the "public 
service" domain, in which it includes not only the BBC but the 
independent, commercial, channels currently transmitting broadcast 
programmes.
The overall failure to examine the finer details of public/private 
intercourse is also in evidence in relation to the general debate on 
regulation. As we have argued elsewhere, (Lewis and Harden 1983) 
regulation can and does occur in the public sector as the private, while 
in both "domains" regulation, especially in Britain, can be formal or 
informal. The relationship of British Airways and the Civil Aviation 
Authority clearly makes this point while the other commercial nationalised 
industries have been subject both to the very occasional formal 
ministerial direction and to extreme pressure of the less formal variety, 
most recently in the shape of cash limits which have had important effects 
on both medium and long term planning and on concrete programme goals. We 
argued at the time that ownership and regulation are conceptually distinct 
and that at least four combinations are possible; viz. private ownership 
with or without regulation and public ownership with or without 
regulation. When de-legalisation is discussed however, private ownership 




























































































view that this is of itself misleading for a number of reasons, just a few 
of which we shall outline shortly. Briefly, however, we would argue that 
various informal processes may link public and private decision-making 
even in the absence of formal regulatory mechanisms. Even so, given that 
the state sees its role in part as being to create conditions for markets 
to flourish then it is thereby and immediately involved in private 
ordering, while we know for example that favourable conditions of a highly 
preferential kind are as capable of being offered by the public sector to 
the private as by the public sector to another part of the public sector. 
Recent concern over the links between British Oxygen, (BOC) a publicly 
quoted company, and the National Health Service (NHS), a formal part of 
British Central government, fired by a large growth in BOC's profits taken 
from health care makes the point neatly. (The Guardian, January 16 1984.)
We shall develop this later. However there remains much to say in 
relation to the increasing compenetration of state and society.
We shall speak to the Gower Report on Investor Protection shortly but 
here we wish to extract a general point. Self-regulation or self- 
governance, taking account as it often must, of general considerations of 
importance to the public is in reality a delegation of public functions to 
private control insofar as it is acknowledged that direct government 
regulation is likely to represent the alternative. This is clearly true 
of important aspects of the work of the City of London, of trade unions 
and many other commercial undertakings. As far as Lloyds and the Stock 
Exchange are concerned, this is clearly spelt out in the Gower Report 
itself.
We believe it is worth re-stating a matter which we have expressed 
elsewhere. Where a constitution is "hidden", as is the British, it is 
difficult to tell whether or not fundamental change in the complex 




























































































especially whether market ideology is capable of becoming so dominant as 
not only to legitimate both privatisation and de-regulation but also the 
irrationalities introduced into public sector decision-making by such as a 
system of cash limits and general restraints on borrowing. We not only 
lack an adequate conceptualisation of byzantine relations between "public" 
and "private" but we lack the institutional arrangements through law which 
would allow us to consider the nature and balance of those relations 
vis-a-vis the overarching legitimation issues.
Networks: the British passion
A much discussed issue of network linkage in modern government in 
recent times has been the issue of corporatism, whereby government 
purposes are sought to be effected through representative groups who then, 
for the benefits which they can bargain with government, seek to deliver 
government policies through their constituencies. This is not the place 
to pursue well-worn arguments surrounding these developments save to say 
that corporatist tendencies not only create another dimension on the 
public/private plane but for the most part operate only subject to 
informal mechanisms which are not in any regular sense "accountable". They 
allow government to proceed "by other means" and as such are simply an 
example of performing law-jobs covertly without regard to the underlying 
principles of legitimation which we insist inform the true British 
Constitution (see Lewis and Wiles 1984). Recent work, however, has 
detected a variant of this genre which its authors label "Welfare 
Corporatism" and whose essential features are those of privileged access 
for, e.g., house builders, building societies and other private financial 
institutions and the common cause made by managers, professional and 
skilled workers to support social policies which exclude, especially, the 
poor. The convergence produces a "private" welfare system which weakens 




























































































welfare arrangements depend upon state sanction but political battles over 
their injustice can be avoided if the state appears not to be involved. 
Welfare corporatism, it is argued, creates a useful illusion since many 
policies which benefit the privileged do not appear on the agenda of open 
politics. Despite "fiscal crisis", indirect state support has continued 
or increased, at the same time as the less privileged have faced a 
diminishing of resources. This transformation of welfare, the argument 
runs, has been hidden while the beneficiaries of these developments are 
convinced that their advantages accrue from the operation of the market or 
from private household virtues, rather than from government (Harrison 
1984, Gower 1984). We have argued that the real importance of the debate 
surrounding various versions of corporatist thought lies in exposing 
another part of the working of the processes of British Government, of 
identifying private/public linkages and of highlighting problems of 
accountability and constitutionality. In this respect corporatist ebbs 
and flows are of a piece with the thrust of our general arguments 
concerning the need to legitimise the processes of public action through 
our informing set of immanent expectations. That public instit­
ution-building is called for to take the informal legal and para-legal 
processes out of the shadows. This issue is evaded by speaking of such 
developments as "de-legalisation", the contraction of the state and the 
like.
In discussing the bewildering array of networks which conceal the 
nature of public/private relations we touched upon the British Oxygen 
affair. It is worth drawing this out a little though we would not wish to 
suggest that the problems surrounding the public interest in this matter 
are anything other than symptomatic of the difficulties in lending 
constitutional credibility to government/private sector commercial 




























































































Committee decided to examine an exclusive contract which the 
Department of Health and Social Security has given to BOC and which would 
allow the Company to extend its monopoly in supplying medical gases and 
equipment to the National Health Service. A joint non-government 
investigation by the Guardian Newspaper and the College of Health, a body 
set up in 1983 to protect health service consumers, was the occasion for 
the heightened public interest. The report draws attention to the 
confidential nature of price negotiations between the DHSS and BOC, to the 
existence of an exclusive contract for which other contractors were not 
allowed to bid and, inter alia, to the fact that some thirty per cent of 
the group's £150 million operating profit in the preceding financial year 
came from its health care business. Less than ten years ago it 
constituted less than 10 per cent. It is nearly 30 years since the 
monopolies and restrictive practices legislation was used to examine these 
matters and the undertakings which the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) extracted would now need to be considerably re-vamped if they were 
to be properly policed by the Office of Fair Trading. (College of Health 
1984.)
Just one more illustration of the difficulties of untangling public 
and private relationships will be offered before attempting to speak more 
broadly about the problems of networks, of "village life" (Heclo and 
Wildavsky 1981, 3) and the institutionalisation of these relations through 
law towards constitutional acceptability. Re-legalisation then, rather 
than de-legalisation.
Networks and re-legalisation
We have referred constantly to the networks of power in Britain and we 
now need to say a little more on this level before we can bring the 
preceding strands of our argument together. Reiterating that public power 




























































































with their client groups it needs to be heavily stressed that the 
institutional forms assumed for the exercise of public power are 
heterogeneous to say the least. In a range of areas, governmental power 
is mediated through formal quasi-government and quasi-non-government 
agencies (see Barker 1982, Lewis 1985). However, it is safe to say that 
with the possible exception of the Civil Aviation Authority most of these 
bodies exercise their power without any very stringent form of public law 
control; no rule-making procedures, grievance procedures - the Government 
White Paper after the Hunt Report on Cable untypically pointed to the need 
for such procedures in a limited set of circumstances surrounding disputes 
over pay-as-you-view problems, (HMSO 1983, para 115) - independent appeal 
mechanisms or the like. Although in many ways we would favour an 
expansion in number of such bodies, the way they currently operate in 
Britain tends to obfuscate decision-making to a considerable degree. The 
reason for this is that they often operate with a veneer of independence 
which disguises the strong pressure exerted by Whitehall for which it is 
prepared to accept little responsibility; indeed even the extent of that 
pressure is clouded beneath blankets of sophisticated and tutored forms of 
secrecy (Lewis and Harden 1982).
It goes without saying that absent such intermediate bodies other 
government/client relationships are likely to be even more obscured. We 
have spoken elsewhere (Lewis and Harden 1984) about the understated 
influence of lobbies in Britain in circumstances where public lawyers have 
had very little to say about devices for prohibiting ex parte contacts and 
for putting discussion on the record. The position has been well 
summarised by an "outsider";
"British administration mastered the principles of cooperation and
mutual self interest long before the "corporate state" became a




























































































The British Oxygen Case highlights some of the peculiarly British culture 
surrounding problems of the "contract state" and it is worth adding 
perhaps that in terms of government contracts at large public law forms 
are lamentably more absent that say in the United States (Lewis 1975).
Informally bargained outcomes, the decisions and nondecisions 
accommodated through networks of civility and conviviality represent very 
substantially the operation of the 'law jobs' of planning and monitoring 
and resolving grievances, (albeit ordinarily in an atmosphere of organised 
non-disclosure). Given what we have argued about the compenetration of 
the public and private spheres and given our concept of law it becomes 
then something of a nonsense to talk about de-legalisation in its ordinary 
meaning. If we argue that the immanent underlying principles informing 
British constitutional expectations are openness and some form of 
accountability then our task becomes that of re-legalisation through 
institution-building based on these legitimating principles. We would not 
of course argue that the legitimation foundations of the British state are 
explained or exhausted simply by appeal to these principles but we do 
argue that they are central to an internal re-examination of the concept 
of legitimacy which may well be a dialectical process (see Trubek 1977). 
Within that framework then let us attempt to introduce some conceptual 
formulations both of the problems and possible emergent institutional 
responses. We shall, in a later section, point to discrete areas of 
recent activity in Britain which exemplify the need to address ourselves 
to these large constitutional questions but in introducing some issues of 
a conceptual nature we shall turn briefly to the problems of the 
nationalised industries and to the matter of restrictive trade practices.
It has been recently argued that "anti-trust" regulation both in 
Britain, the USA and the EEC is to a large extent regulation by bargaining 




























































































subject to the jurisdiction of the MMC, these remarks were directed to the 
private sector. However, long before the Competition Act 1980, regulation 
through bargaining and informal processes characterised the way successive 
governments handled their dealings with those industries. Government 
intervention over pricing, borrowing, pay negotiations and investment in 
the interests, variously, of counter-inflation policy, industrial policy 
and macro economic policy had taken place through informal and 
unaccountable processes which by-passed the formal legal authority to give 
directions to those industries. (NEDO 1976. Redwood and Hatch 1982.) Some 
of the same problems emerge in relation to the operation of competition 
policy. Although the machinery adopted is much more formal and public 
than is the case across much of British Government considerable leverage 
is still employed by the Secretary of State himself without engaging the 
machinery as such. Preliminary responsibility for defending the public 
interest rests with the Director-General of Fair Trading who decides 
whether to initiate further action after his own investigations have been 
conducted. Behind him, so to speak, lies the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry. Until the 1980 Act only through action by him could general 
investigations be undertaken by the MMC. The Secretary of State retains 
power to order investigations of monopoly situations and anticompetitive 
practices and he also has veto power over any investigation ordered by the 
Director-General and is entitled to guide the D-G in setting standards for 
referring monopoly situations to the MMC. We have no doubt that these 
rather complex institutional arrangements have the potential to deliver an 
open and public examination of these matters even if considerable 
improvement in this respect currently needs to be effected. Indeed a 
reformed set of procedures such as these could well have considerable 
analogical potential. Nonetheless the Secretary of State's role seems to 




























































































be satisfied that a sufficient degree of openness is secured. Un­
surprisingly perhaps, the British courts have also ensured that his 
discretion will rarely be supervised (R v Secretary of State for Trade ex 
parte Anderson Strathclyde (1983) 2 All ER 233). Even the official 
government position is that "decisions on merger references are taken on a 
case by case basis rather than by applying a rigid set of rules" (HMSO 
1978b).
There have in recent times been some complaints from industrialists 
that they have been offered little guidance on the government's thinking 
relating to the criteria for the acceptability of mergers. In a typically 
British way they have been confronted with the problem of how "to 
understand the coded signals with which most ... ministers impart 
information on subjects they prefer not to talk about directly". 
Furthermore in recent years there has been a number of complaints from 
industrialists that the Trade Department has been taking somewhat 
arbitrary decisions, a matter also not to the taste apparently of the 
Director-General of Fair Trading himself (Financial Times 18 March 1983). 
Following the 1978 White Paper no full-scale [public] review of merger 
policy has been undertaken. Thus although in many ways the institutional 
arrangements for examining the area of "competition" policy are much more 
developed than is the case in a number of other areas subject to the 
Whitehall writ, public law controls could yet make substantial 
contributions towards opening up the process to a more thorough-going 
dialogue (Korah 1982, Green 1983). Attempts have been made in the United 
States to deal with not dissimilar problems as witness the Antitrust 
Procedures and Penalties Act 1974. Although in the view of some 




























































































theless, in the usual pattern of American Administrative law, addresses 
itself to one of the most vexed problems of modern public government; 
viz.ex parte communications (Boyer 1983).
Government action, inaction and constitutionality
We argue elsewhere (Lewis and Harden 1985) that in Britain the 
underlying expectations of openness and accountability mean that the 
activities of all public actors and their agents are the proper subject of 
public scrutiny unless a strong case to the contrary can be made out, that 
case in its turn having to run the gauntlet of public and reasoned 
scrutiny. Given that we have made out a case, even in the course of this 
paper, that public actors have extensive links, formal and informal with 
private ordering and given that it is in Britain a constitutional axiom 
that Parliament can exercise omnicompetent power within its subject 
territories then it follows that the relationship of public actors to 
private concentrations of power is a matter of constitutional vitality 
too. This in turn poses questions about the instrumentalities and 
institutions for illuminating this relationship, a matter to which we have 
already adverted. We shall have more to say on this issue shortly. 
However, baldly stated, these propositions fail to identify an important 
element which we have only hinted at in our remarks concerning competition 
policy in particular and ex parte contacts more generally.
It ought to be commonplace that public actors these days operate as 
much through legally conferred discretionary powers as through legal 
duties. Indeed the literature on discretion is now too voluminous to need 
more than a passing nod. However, very little distinctly constitutional 
attention has been directed to this matter, at least in the United 
Kingdom. Interest in rule-making procedures, for example, has been 
substantially confined to circumstances where the executive either 




























































































openness to satisfy the critics. But as K. C. Davis pointed out some 
little time ago (1971) the non-exercise of power is really quite often as 
interesting as its formal exercise. Especially, we might add, where it is 
the result of network conviviality, bargained outcomes and the 
deliberations of the cosy embrace. In other words, not least in the 
practices of British Government. We believe that the circumstances in 
which and the procedures adopted for decisions not to engage in legitimate 
action are an important referrent in any constitutional description. This 
means that "government in the sunshine" and putting major government 
non-decisions on the record needs to be worked at. There are numerous 
ways in which procedures could be devised for exposing the thinking 
processes of Ministers when they decide not to refer a merger to the MMC 
or not to press ahead with a piece of legislation originally favoured, or 
indeed why it had rejected some policy options in favour of others. A 
growing literature surrounding the issue of inaction or non-decision­
making is beginning to appear in the United States and has, we believe, 
considerable significance for Britain which is much more in need of 
institutionalising its constitutional practices. We take this stand since 
we hope to have shown that the extraordinary compenetration of 
state/society, of public/private in Britain means that legitimation 
requires the exposure of the networked relationships, whether resulting in 
"positive" action or not and the building of institutions to ensure that 
the outcomes of the relationships are the deployment of resources 
necessary for rational and efficient conduct. Let us speak briefly to 
some of the American literature.
"Administrative inaction occurs at least as often as administrative 
action. Its effects can be just as influential. When the will of 
Congress is not properly implemented, people lose benefit of 




























































































effectuate social change. Judicial review of agency non-implemen­
tation of a statute is both necessary and proper to give effect to the 
congressional intent and to assure the legitimacy of the admin­
istrative system" (Lehner 1983).
Some movement has occurred towards the development of a court-enforced 
duty for agencies to speak to the non-implementation of programmes 
(Stewart and Sunstein 1982) and thereby to fill an accountability gap by 
forcing agencies to listen to the claims of the electorate. All this has 
to be seen in the context of the Freedom of Information Act, the 
Government in the Sunshine Act and various executive orders which together 
demand that the agency accumulate a fairly complete record of subjects 
that have become the object of agency consideration. Combine this with 
the requirement to produce contemporaneous records sufficient to show the 
public and the court its data, methodology and reasoning and they are on 
notice to keep an up-to-date record of anything that may be of concern to 
the public.
Overall, this increase in documentation and congressional direction 
gives precision even to non-implementation and thus discounts a 
concern that these actions are too indefinite for judicial review" 
(Lehner 1983, 635).
Problems surrounding non-discursive public behaviour then are common 
enough though their solutions will have to be conceptualised after 
empirical mapping no doubt according to local conditions. In Britain the 
problem is identified periodically by lightning but never by const­
itutional arclight. Thus, to take but one example, in relation to the 
powers of consumer councils of the nationalised industries suggestions 




























































































making published recommendations to the industry and the failure of the 
industries to respond or to disclose required information (HMSO 1978a, 32; 
and Department of Trade, 1982, 45, 46).
We can find many such examples and will be pointing to a number of 
troublesome areas. However, the task as we see it is to engage in 
empirical work within the British governmental machine in and around the 
areas of corporatism, bargained outcomes, networks, regulation, 
privatisation and the like; work which is directed to building conceptual 
categories to bridge the gap between raw empirical observations and 
constitutionality. In other words, where the constitutional concerns 
expressed here are set in a series of discrete analyses, not only should 
we hope to target a number of institutional forms for advancing the twin 
ends of discourse and learning, but simultaneously we should begin to 
identify patterns of oommon policy problems and potential solutions 
(Teubner 1983, 264). In doing so we hope to provide a particularly 
British perspective on the problems of reflexivity and soft and other law 
forms. Given the enlarged concept of law which we adopt this represents a 
natural development.
In concluding this section we would add one item. Though adopting the 
position that this level of institution-building is demanded at the 
normative constitutional level we would add the rider that the demands of 
"effeciency" point in the same direction. Though not wishing to engage a 
refined dialogue about the nature and forms of efficiency we would rest 
here on one contemporary-sounding argument; that of rationality crises in 
times of increased organizational complexity and the corresponding need to 
"ground" rationality in learning processes.
In general terms let it be said that modernity tends to be accompanied 
by economic crisis management, confusion in the face of complex 



























































































political-legal control (Teubner 1983, 268). This is one of the reasons 
why broad delegations of power have been acceptable for the American 
administrative agencies and why the development of cable in Britain ought, 
it is said, to be conducted through general as opposed to detailed 
regulation. The industry, it is urged, is likely to grow in ways which 
are currently impossible to forecast (Hunt 13). In the world of banking 
we have been told that an era of financial innovation and institutional 
change though observable is not easily susceptible to quantitative study 
(Fforde 1983). More broadly we are constantly told that the system cannot 
keep its own promises whether in terms of social regulation, macro- 
economic policies or in relation to non-market interventions. This has 
been well documented in Britain though it has been seen to be a more 
broadly-based problem suffused with difficulties surrounding inadequate 
programme formulation, information or implementation capacities (Reich 
1983, 8, 35; Ashford passim).
Re-legalisation then is the urgent and pressing need for Britain in 
the 1980s. It is a conception which must be based upon open and 
accountable procedures across a wide range of issues given the 
extraordinary defects of our dignified constitution. We have long been 
persuaded that, for the most part, (and without prejudice to the 
protection of substantive human rights) the primary task of reconstituted 
legal machinery in Britain is to ensure that a "hard look" is taken at 
countervailing arguments concerning the formulation of major policy 
issues. The quality of political life depends crucially on the 
institutional atmosphere in which it takes place and that is the context 






























































































Now this vein of thinking does not incline us to offer a detailed 
constitutional blueprint and we accept that a mix of types of law will be 
necessary to ensure the efficient conduct of the state for the foreseeable 
future. We do not expect the abandonment of detailed regulation in all 
areas but we do believe that in relation to many matters which are high on 
the agenda of public affairs, political choice should take place within an 
institutional framework which encourages rational discourse and sets the 
standards of the terms of debate without predicating particular outcomes. 
In this regard there are important lessons to be learned from recent 
experience in the United States.
A States-side excursus
We believe that the history of regulation in the USA points up a 
number of key issues that any re-examination of the relationship between 
the governors and the governed in Britain ought to take on board. First 
it is clear to us that in developing the "hard look doctrine" the Federal 
Courts were right in insisting on a rejection of the crystal-ball approach 
to the resolution of tough questions. ( Natural Resources Defense Council 
v Morton 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).) On the other hand there 
has been a clear move away from the rigid constraints of formal 
rule-making on the record in recent years with both Congress and the 
Courts fighting shy of it. Rather there has been a move towards 
flexibility dependent however on producing a "substantial enquiry" and a 
"thorough, probing, in-depth review" (Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v 
Volpe 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)). The search then has been to avoid formal 
adjudicative procedures, whilst going beyond the arbitrary and capricious 
test. The latter, known as "soft" judicial review, sometimes less 
charitably as the "lunacy" test has been strongly evident in Britain when 
judicial review has been available at all. (Associated Picture Houses Ltd




























































































regulatory reform is to perfect an interest-representation model which 
will import political checks into the administrative arena"(Boyer,B. 1 9 8 3). 
The search elsewhere has been called that of "creating an independent 
model of administrative decisionmaking" (Verkuil 1974, 187), and has 
clearly been influenced by the belief that ex parte contacts are in danger 
of undermining the fairness of the whole administrative process (Pierce 
and Shapiro 1981).
The flexibility of "hard look" then has been generally welcomed in 
that participation can take the form of conferences, consultation with 
industry committees, mixes of written and oral comments all directed at 
avoiding the unsatisfactory nature of the trial-type process. What is 
vital is to provide "recorded agency reaction to crucial submissions" 
which is basic to effective judicial review (Verkuil 1974, 239)- This can 
be seen to demand different levels of detail in differing contexts and 
whereas environmental impact statements and regulatory impact analyses 
(Lewis and Harden 1983, 219) might be thought necessary on some occasions, 
less rigorous methods of producing discourse will serve on others. 
Interestingly however, cost-benefit analysis techniques are very rarely 
publicly employed in Britain for the purposes which we are advocating; 
techniques which, for all their defects, are capable of enfranchising 
interests which might otherwise be overlooked. Greater attention to such 
analysis could also help to avoid allegations that participative 
procedures might be captured by 'concerned publics'.
"It may be claimed that any objective attempt to measure the 
significance of these 'missing' interests, however suspect its details 
may be, is a useful contribution towards assessing the totality of 




























































































In the USA there now seems general accord that regulatory procedure 
requires a new flexibility which respects traditional concerns for 
accuracy, fairness and acceptability, but which meets the need for more 
efficient administration. The strength of informal hard-look rulemaking 
resides in its unique combination of flexibility, expedition and fairness. 
The ability to "go outside the record" makes it much like the political 
process itself (ABA, 1979; Verkuil 1974). Change is clearly in the air to 
ensure that flexible models are developed which provide comprehensive and 
rational standards. The Regulatory Reform Bill of the 97th Congress 
(Lewis and Harden 1983), which had Democratic and Republican support is 
evidence of a continuation of this conviction while elsewhere 'rigour with 
flexibility' has taken the form of proposals for negotiated regulation 
which would involve engaging a convenor to discuss issues with interested 
parties and to propose regulations as an arbitrator suggests compromises. 
The role of the agency would essentially be to provide expertise and 
support (Harter 1982). Although this particular idea seems to embrace 
most of the weaknesses of the "concerned publics" syndrome its aura is 
contemporary in that it marries concerns about rationality crises and 
cognitive difficulties with a call for fully developed information being 
placed before the various protagonists. Underneath all these proposals 
lies a cri de coeur about democratic societies in general;
"It is necessary for democratic institutions to adapt their workings 
so as to meet the necessities of modern governmental agendas. Should 
this fail to occur, democracies may fail to sustain acceptable 
standards of executive performance, or alternatively power will sweep 
away to hidden bureaucracies, or to some type of 'business 





























































































In Britain, these concerns are especially pointed. For largely fortuitous 
reasons there is the occasional breakthrough whereby the zero-sum, 
"all-or-nothing" nature of judicial review of executive behaviour is 
dented. Thus, warts and all, the role afforded to the Social Security 
Advisory Committee under the 1980 Social Security Act to cause the 
Secretary of State to take a "hard look" at objections to proposed 
regulations relating to the supplementary benefit scheme is to be 
welcomed. (See for example s.10(4) Social Security Act 1980 and HMSO 1982 
Appendix 3 and 1983c Chapter 3.) Elsewhere the Civil Aviation Authority 
has been praised for breaking the mould of administrative law in Britain. 
"... the CAA had developed longer term policies and standards by 
analysis and researching regulatory problems by not restricting itself 
to a court-like role, by mixing regulatory strategies and by 
withstanding departmental interference. The agency's expertise has 
allowed it to deal with complex or 'polycentric' problems by 
exercising judgment against against a background of published policy 
statements" (Baldwin 1983).
These, however, are isolated developments. In general, procedures for 
major policy initatives in Britain are defective in terms of both 
democratic conventions and the efficient absorption of the contributions 
of broad-based "publics".
Developments in Britain in the 1980s
It should be clear from the foregoing that important questions of 
legitimation through law, of constitutionality have been substantially 
suppressed for some little time past. The last two decades have, it is 
true, seen an upsurge of interest in administrative and public law 
controls which at the time of writing seems to have 'peaked' in the shape 
of the recently established pressure group, the Freedom of Information 




























































































quickened the pace of unaccountable government and consequently have 
quickened the pulses of some constitution-watchers (see Lewis and Wiles 
1984; Lewis and Harden 1983). Quite apart from significant changes in the 
machinery of government itself there has been a commitment to some measure 
of de-regulation and a large measure of privatisation. Absent the 
machinery for examining these developments which have lain at the heart of 
this paper, it has been easier to make a clean break in the public/private 
arenas than might have been the case elsewhere. In other words, major 
changes in the British state have been put in train without anything 
resembling a great debate. The party/presidential system of government in 
Britain has undoubtedly smoothed over developments which would have 
ruffled many feather's in other governmental systems. It is to a large 
extent the pressure of these events that has caused us to argue for 
re-legalisation in Britain in the 1980s.
We argued in our 1983 paper that for all the defects of American law, 
sudden changes of direction were often accompanied by legal safeguards 
quite absent in the British experience. We would now add to that argument 
the Supreme Court decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of 
the United States, Inc. , et al v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. et al 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 where, in complex circumstances, the Court held 
that de-regulation may require adherence to rule-making procedures and 
that rescission of a rule must be subject to thorough, probing, in-depth 
review lest the Congressional will be ignored. Issues of far greater 
significance are treated in a much more cavalier way in Britain. Consider 
the examination of cable systems;
"The three members of the inquiry were appointed on 6 April and a 
three page "consultation document" was issued the following day. The 
report was submitted less than six months later on 28 September 1982. 




























































































but such evidence had to be produced within eight weeks of the 
publication of the consultative document. That document itself 
consisted of little more than a series of questions on which views and 
comments were invited. Whilst such procedure was roughly analogous to 
the bare statutory requirements of the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
provisions of the American Administrative Procedure Act, it contained 
nothing whatsoever comparable to the "hybrid" devices developed in 
recognition of the fact that bare notice-and-comment is an inadequate 
source of legitimation" (Lewis and Harden 1983, 224).
On all manner of issues it is clear that machinery to examine major 
public issues in settings which encourage cognitive development and the 
monitoring of approved programmes does not exist or is inadequate for the 
task. This is true not only on the level of innovation but on that of 
quality control. For instance, it took a string of scandals on the Lloyds 
insurance market to effect changes, not the least of which was the 
appointment of an outside chief executive with the specific job of 
cleaning the Augean stables. Elsewhere the balance to be struck between 
the detailed regulation of specific practices and the need for general and 
effective public oversight of self-regulation or self-governance will 
require constant adjustment. We have committed ourselves to the view that 
a mix of types of legal framework will be required for the optimum 
ordering of public affairs but in Britain at the moment we have no 
confidence that the means for securing that optimum ordering are 
available. Indeed the culture of British politics, giving as it does, the 
gold, silver and bronze medals to the incumbent politicians who have most 
recently converted the general public to a belief in their overall 
competence, is of itself antagonistic to institutional re-ordering. Thus 




























































































Let us now turn to discrete areas to make out the case for a "hard 
look" at providing optimum procedural solutions for the resolution of 
current dilemmas. There is no doubt that certain forms of de-regulation 
can be positively harmful if the result is to allow the market to 
reproduce the negative externalities which caused the regulation to be 
established in the first place. The state, after all, has an obligation 
"to keep dysfunctional side effects within acceptable limits" (Habermas 
1979, 196). The problem becomes how best to secure that end. For example 
in the USA, the Securities and Exchange Commission has, in recent years, 
engaged in a substantial programme of de-regulation having satisfied 
itself that self-regulation has been significantly improved (Gower 1984, 
18). This will not always be possible and in Britain in 1984 the biggest 
private hospital group called upon the Government to re-instate the Health 
Services Board which formerly regulated and supervised the relationship 
between private medicine and the National Health Service but which had 
recently been disbanded (see The Guardian, 15 February 1984).
If what is required generally throughout the Western world is a 
conceptual system oriented towards social policy which would permit one to 
compare the consequences of different solutions to problems, to accumulate 
critical experience etc. (Teubner 1983, 264) then Britain is in deep 
trouble. Thus, until the beginning of 1984 the sale of public assets 
undertaken since 1979 was reported to have provided large speculative 
gains for investors given that the selling price was in aggregate some 
£400 millions less than current share prices. Moreover it was achieved by 
selling off primarily to pension funds and thereby exchanging one 
unaccountable set of bureaucrats in the West End for another in the City 
of London (The Guardian 12 January 1984). Many of these decisions are 
being taken, it needs to be added, without any [public] discussion of what 




























































































the decisions to sell off being taken. The same problem, somewhat 
exacerbated, applies to the selling off of the Royal Ordnance Factories 
which has been estimated to cost the taxpayer £100 millions at least in 
the short term. The Government believes that in the longer term the move 
will prove beneficial though the opportunity to compare the consequences 
of different courses of action is, unfortunately, denied.
The sale of the Gleneagles Hotel, one of British Rail's prime assets, 
is another case in point. By the beginning of 1984 its value had doubled 
since being sold to the private sector which may or may not say something 
about the anticipated performance of private versus public management but 
given that timing is vital when selling assets one wonders whether selling 
less on commercial principles than on the basis of the latest Treasury 
estimate of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement is necessarily an 
intelligible decision.
The examples could be multiplied but let us look briefly at coach and 
rail competition in a deregulated market. The 1980 Transport Act removed, 
inter alia, licensing constraints on long-distance coach services. The 
change took place after 50 years of stability and was bound therefore to 
have aroused considerable interest. There have been some surprising 
consequences of this decision but we will restrict ourselves to one issue 
alone. The major growth for coach passenger travel has been on routes 
where British Rail already provide not only a high frequency of service, 
but in most cases their best services. British Rail estimate that the 
financial loss from coach competition was £12 million in 1981 and £15 
million in 1982 which of course represents a loss to the taxpayer. This 
has clearly added impetus to BR's determination to amend its pricing 
structure in favour of 'cheap deals', which a government-sponsored report 




























































































para. 5.4). The hard-look at this issue is, more often than not, 
exhausted by debates in the House of Commons and in Committee, the 
standard British forum for the scrutiny of matters of major moment.
We have touched upon the relatively superior constitutionally 
accountable performance of the Civil Aviation Authority already. We need 
here to add that it has also been involved in subjecting at least some 
important aspects of the decision to privatise British Airways to 
scrutiny. In December 1983 the Secretary of State for Transport requested 
that the CAA review the implications of privatisation and this it did 
through extensive consultations with industry and consumer interests. Its 
report, which contained recommendations affecting the future competitive 
balance of British aviation, stands out in splendid isolation as an 
institutional attempt to produce rational discourse in this matter of 
acute sensitivity and controversy (CAA 1984). It should hastily be added, 
however, that not everyone has been enamoured with the quality of the 
report (see The Guardian, 10 September 1984).
All of this naturally locks into the general unaccountability of the 
Nationalised Industries. Institutions can be created to help overcome the 
impotence in not being able to set and monitor objectives through public 
law techniques as was shown by the admirable study of UK Nationalised 
Industries in 1976 (NEDO 1976 and Lewis, 1985) but until now the 
political will has been largely missing. Elsewhere performance has been 
patchy but a number of recent developments suggest some interesting 
possibilities for 'soft' and 'responsive' law techniques which may or may 
not be appropriate more generally.
Cable
We have already regretted the lack of detailed public discussion 
before the Government committed itself to a 'slim-regulation' cable 




























































































examined but we doubt if the regimen adopted will operate at the 'optimum' 
level since cable interests already seem to have captured the government 
departments responsible. The government's economic policies seem very 
much committed to a rapid development of cable while the commercial 
interests affected seemed to have convinced government that detailed 
regulation would deter the necessary capital from being sunk in the 
exercise. Thus the unseemly rush which represented the Hunt Report.
The Hunt Report has been largely accepted uncritically by the 
Government, (HMSO 1983) and so in describing the outline of the proposals 
we shall conflate the Report and the Government response . We shall say 
nothing here of the decision to licence 11 cable experiments as a pilot 
scheme outside the proposed regulatory framework save that a largely 
unregulated beginning is likely to have important bearings on the shape of 
the eventual regulatory framework. Basically the Government's strategy 
can be summarised as follows; cable investment should be privately 
financed and market led. Regulation should be as light as possible and 
the regulatory framework flexible so that it can adapt as technology 
constantly changes what is practicable and economic. A small number of 
key safeguards will be needed with a new cable authority having the 
central role of promoting and overseeing the development of cable systems. 
The process of franchising cable operators will stand at the heart of the 
Authority's activity and flowing from it will be the Authority's 
responsibility for monitoring the performance of cable operators.
It is too early to speculate on the likely performance of either the 
Cable Authority or the new cable industry at large but some warning bells 
need to be sounded. The White Paper says that most of the detailed 
procedures for the franchising exercise will be for the Authority to 
determine and it will decide to what extent it wishes applicants for 




























































































Given the somewhat unsatisfactory history of the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (Lewis 1975) this is an unpromising beginning. We think that 
there is a great deal to be said for the government not insisting on 
detailed regulations for the new cable system if for no other reason than 
that flexibility is part of a necessary learning process. However, we 
should like to be satisfied that the new Authority would operate publicly 
and through published standards and policies and that both its own 
performance and that of the franchise-holders should be subjected to 
guarantees that periodic monitoring of performance took place through some 
version of the "hard look" doctrine ultimately enforceable in the courts. 
Statutory authority for cable programme services is skimpily provided by 
sections 56-59 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 which gives no clue as 
to overall governmental regulatory intentions.
Telecom
Most of our reservations in relation to cable can be repeated inthe
relation to the reorganising of/ British telecommunications system under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1984. We now know enough to suggest that 
our brightest hopes are unlikely to be fulfilled. The following is as 
accurate a statement now as the time when it was first uttered;
"We are treated to an extraordinary melange [ of an Act ] which 
effectively sets up a new "Quango" in the form of the Director-General 
for Telecommunications whose office is, perhaps curiously, to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration. A whole series of "notice and comment" type 
provisions is littered around [the Act] which contains a Tele­
communications Code (itself primary legislation), extremely limited 
provision for licensing hearings and a long-stop of recourse to the 
courts. The latter is on the basis of ultra vires determinations, 




























































































hearings representing the more acceptable forum for engaging opposing 
arguments of a technical and/or policy-oriented nature. It is a 
curious blend of market-mindedness along with the acceptance of some 
necessary regulation and licensing, more dictated, one would imagine, 
by international treaty obligations than an inner sense of conviction" 
(Lewis and Harden 1983, 229).
The regulation of banking
We could develop a number of the preceding themes and illustrate the 
haphazard and disorganised nature of control or regulation over the 
insurance industry or the building society movement. We would thereby be 
able to show how incoherent government policy has been over generations to 
responsibility for the the "private" sector and how substantially it has 
failed to embed constitutional expectations of openness and account­
ability. The exercise would be easy to construct but instead we shall say 
just a little about regulation and banking in the belief that these few 
remarks will subsume what could be said about some of the other financial 
services before we turn to the Gower Report.
In spite of the vicissitudes of informal governmental pressures there 
has, until recently, been little external regulation of the banking sector 
which has traditionally been dominated by a handful of major institutions. 
Self-regulation by the banks, supported by the customary authority of the 
Bank of England, was sufficient at least to maintain adequate standards of 
liquidity and to preserve the quality of banking business. Nevertheless, 
within the context of general autonomy there have been variations with the 
early 1970s as a period of very substantial freedom from interference.
However, during the 1970s prudential standards outside the primary 
banking sector were undermined by competitive pressures and by demands for 
credit from borrowers, particularly in the field of commercial property, 




























































































lending institutions grew up in the secondary sector and by 1974 something 
of a crisis had ensued. Apart from the building societies there was no 
comprehensive legislation governing the activity of deposit-taking and no 
single supervisory authority. A number of ad hoc statutory provisions 
emerged but it became clear that a new and more comprehensive framework 
was needed while impetus for reform came from the EEC with the First 
Banking Directive in 1977 which required the establishment of formal 
arrangements for licensing deposit-takers. The result was the Banking Act 
1979, the central provision of which is that of general prohibition of 
deposits without specific authorisation from the Bank of England. The Act 
contains broad criteria relating to the conduct of banking business but 
leaves a wide measure of discretion to the bank of England. The criteria 
have been described as raising "complex questions involving subjective 
decisions" (Cooper 1984, 256).
There is much talk these days of financial supermarkets growing or of 
para-banking activities emerging which are difficult to predict with any 
precision given the current state of money markets and of technology.
"Innovation of this kind underlines the need for a parallel response 
from the supervisor, keeping under review both the legislative basis 
for supervision and the appropriate form of supervision, to ensure 
that new techniques of banking are both properly conducted and 
supervised" (Fforde 1983, 368)
These remarks seem to us to be eminently in keeping with the concerns 
which we have expressed throughout this paper but we are bound to say that 
there is nothing in the Banking Act itself which impels anyone to keep 
this counsel and certainly nothing of an institutional sort to facilitate 
the exercises envisaged. In the British setting, this is likely to mean 
that any reviews undertaken will be to a greater or lesser extent 




























































































detectable while the shape and nature of supervisory patterns remains 
uncertain, though with a preference for a •pragmatic' approach strongly 
evident in relation to financial services generally (Bank of England 
1984).
Investor Protection
Leaving the clearing banks to one side, the most interesting 
developments in terms of money markets in Britain in recent years have 
related to the matter of investor protection in general and the City 
of London in particular. Many of the issues which we have touched upon in 
this paper have been raised during the course of these developments and 
they have culminated, in our sense at least, in the Gower Report.
Now the Stock Exchange, the futures and commodity markets and the like». 
are clearly very centrally within the remit of the public lawyer's 
concerns given what we have been at pains to argue throughout this paper. 
The articulation between government proper and 'markets' as important as 
these would need little stressing at the best of times. Given a 
government which is wedded to controlling the money supply and to relying 
upon the City for raising money for substantial projects within the 
general ambit of its programmes, this becomes particularly acute. Not 
only are we talking about a very large commitment to privatisation but 
also to projects such as cable, the funding of the European Airbus and the 
like. Gower, coming in the slipstream of these events, poses fascinating 
questions in relation to degrees and types of regulation thought desirable 
in the money markets at large. To this we now briefly turn.
In 1981 the Secretary of Trade asked Professor Gower to examine the 
protection available to investors in securities and to recommend 
legislative reform in the light of his findings. Professor Gower's brief 
of course extended beyond examining the Stock Exchange, but not only did 




























































































supervened before his Report could be written. The Exchange had, in the 
last few years, twice been forced to defend itself before the Monopolies 
Commission and was, during 1983, doing so before the Restrictive Practices 
Court where its rule-book was under attack from the Director General of 
Fair Trading. Just before Gower reported, the issue was informally 
settled out of court on the basis of an understanding between the Council 
of the Exchange and the Department of Trade and Industry. (See statement 
by the Secretary of State, H.C. Debs. 27 July 1983 Cols. 1194, 1195.) It 
seems clear that the compromise was one produced by a combination of 
substantial change in the world's money markets, considerable foreign, 
especially American competition, three EEC Directives on listed 
securities, and the Gower investigation itself. The development was not 
the result of any self-regulating mechanism as such though perhaps in the 
future the new arrangements will prove more satisfactory in this respect.
We shall not here detail the nature of the accords between the Council 
of the Stock Exchange and the DTI save to say that they involve the 
introduction of lay members on to the Council itself, the establishment of 
a body independent of Council members to hear appeals against a refusal to 
admit to membership and the reform of the existing Appeals Committee which 
attends to disciplinary matters. The implementation of these measures is 
to be monitored by the DTI and the Bank of England to ensure the evolution 
and development of the Stock Exchange as an efficient, competitive and 
suitably regulated central market which affords proper protection to 
investors. Gower himself regards this as a considerable advance and one 
which "completes the conversion of the Stock Exchange from a private club 
to a recognised self-regulatory agency within a statutory framework of 




























































































only remark that whatever is happening in the Square Mile, it is not 
de-legalisation but re-legalisation, the legitimacy of which will be much 
debated in the months and years to come.
Gower pins his colours very clearly to the mast of self-regulation, 
subject, we hasten to add, to effective oversight backed by limited 
regulation. He clearly regards the financial markets as being 
over-regulated in some areas if by that we mean the regulation of fine 
detail. His position can be best summarised as being that the scandals 
which have so beset the City of London in recent times are less the result 
of self-regulation than of the fact that such self-policing has not always 
been subject to effective surveillance (1984, 1.10). It is then by this 
standard that his recommendations have to be judged and we are bound to 
say at the outset that we are less than overwhelmed by the likelihood of 
this being achieved under his schema. However, in some respects this is a 
mere aside.
To a very large extent Gower has bowed to City pressure that the new 
regime should have at its centre a web qf self-regulating bodies, based 
very largely on trade and professional rather than functional groupings. 
The Lloyd's scandals of 1979-80 have not deflected him from this belief 
and he adopts the attendant view that the reconstituted arrangements 
provide an adequate framework for the protection of the public. The stark 
outline of the Gower scheme is as follows;
a) A new Investor Protection Act administered by either the DTI or a 
self-standing Commission.
b) Investment business to be carried on only through a process of 
registration conducted either by the Department (or Commission) or 
one of the self-regulatory bodies.
c) The Act to constitute a broad-based regulatory framework within which 



























































































d) That self-regulatory bodies would be responsible for the conduct of
their members and in turn would be afforded certain privileges.
In many ways the crunch issue is "the DTI or a self-standing 
Commission". Gower, originally a proponent of the American SEC has 
apparently moved in favour of vesting powers in the Department, arguing 
that when the SEC was originally set up in the United States it was in a 
context where nothing comparable to the self-regulatory structure which we 
have now begun successfully to adopt, existed. We entertain considerable 
doubts about the role of the Department not least on account of the cogent 
reasons put forward by Professor Gower himself when rehearsing the pros 
and cons of the argument. We feel particularly doubtful in relation to 
the growing internationalisation of investment business where a Commission 
might be better equipped to establish links with agencies in other 
countries and to tackle general problems flowing from an increasing 
internationalisation of financial markets (Gower 1984, 3-19).
Within the Gower framework the Bank of England would continue to act 
on behalf of the Treasury in relation to the surveillance of the commodity 
and financial exchanges even though ultimately the Government (or 
Commission) would have responsibility for the regulation of the markets. 
The other point of major institutional significance perhaps is that the 
Council for the Securities Industry (CSI) should retain its role as the 
umbrella and coordinating body of self-regulatory agencies and 
associations. With a full-time Director-General and a larger support 
staff than it currently possesses it should be able to effect general 
supervision of self-regulating agencies. Even after Gower had gone to bed 
the CSI continued to have problems in establishing its authority over its 
constituents but Professor Gower may be right that the new legislative 




























































































Gower is suggesting then that for a very important sector of British 
power and influence, self-regulation with effective oversight is the way 
forward. That detailed regulation is not the most effective way of 
delivering on the public interest. In this respect he is no doubt moving 
with the times and is in fact echoing a sentiment which found expression 
in the field of Health and Safety in Britain as far back as 1972 (Robens). 
The health and safety experience is in fact somewhat mixed but this is not 
to gainsay Gower's arguments. What is crucial, and what Gower himself 
accepts is crucial, is the effectiveness of the oversight. In this 
respect we believe that DTI oversight in the culture of British politics 
is likely to be less effective than a self-standing commission, provided 
always that its constitution was to be informed by principles of openness 
and accountability of a sort currently lacking for most Quangos (see Lewis 
1985). We shall return to this theme at the end of our remarks but we 
regard the kind of framework suggested by Gower as being one kind of means 
of re-legalising an important area of public concern. Effective 
self-regulation, effective oversight, effective ombudsmen and grievance 
mechanisms (all of which find some support in Gower) seem more likely to 
produce rational discourse and an evolving learning process than does a 
strict regulatory regime whose inflexibility and fierceness can easily 
cause it to fall into relative desuetude.
Conclusions
We have argued that an analysis of Britain's working constitution is 
long overdue; that public power and its relationship with private 
configurations is inadequately charted in the constitutional literature 
and that this in substantial measure relates to a failure to examine the 
legitimation foundations of the British compact which to an important 
degree are expected to be characterised by notions of openness and 




























































































been exercised in a largely covert manner through networks of conviviality 
which obscure the workings of the British state. Law-jobs, social 
processes, get done then only in small degree under the public gaze and if 
our constitutional expectations are to be enfranchised and encashed then 
legal processes need to be re-examined and re-legitimated.
In this belief we hold no especial brief for "gesellschaft" forms of 
law and, indeed»for the most part regard them as less relevant to the 
problems of the late twentieth century British state than a "revised 
model" of administrative or public law much more dependent upon procedural 
devices directed at producing "hard look" and rational discourse. In 
contemporary Britain however, much remains to be done before pledges will 
be honoured.
We have argued very staunchly (Lewis and Harden 1984) that reforms to 
the model of British Government, helpful though many of them might be, 
will ultimately do little to produce accountability and rationality in the 
policy-making process. The power of Party and elite consensus will see to 
that. Only alternative bodies empowered, inter alia through Freedom of 
Information and properly equipped, can provide alternative modes of 
discourse for rational choices to be made. Given that we adopt this 
position then we clearly have no objection in principle to self­
regulation, loosely supervised, characterising much of our public law in 
the years to come.
We have objected to the unseemly haste of the Hunt Report but 
nevertheless are prepared to accept that general oversight as opposed to 
detailed regulation can provide the opportunity to respond flexibly as the 
industry develops in ways which are difficult to forecast at any given 
time. We are sympathetic to the idea of a light regulatory touch and the 
adoption of a reactive rather than a proactive style (Hunt 1982, 13; HMSO 




























































































complexity requires a public learning process and not upon any ignorant 
version of marketisra. A responsive law, to use the argot of Nonet and 
Selznick, perceives social discourse in such settings as "sources of 
knowledge and opportunities for self-correction" ( 1978, 77). To put it 
another way, such legal processes "can arrange patterns in which societal 
agents can discursively advance their goals and objectives" (Reich 1983, 
30).
Thus with new learning situations especially, it is less than sensible 
to prescribe from the centre, a disease to which the British are 
particularly prone. But if we are serious about such claims then 
effective sources of knowledge must depend to a considerable degree on 
public participation of varying kinds simply to ensure the cognitive 
competence of the organisation concerned, quite apart from any larger 
notions of consent. Freedom of Information, which we espouse vigorously 
(Lewis and Harden 1984) is probably a pre-requisite but it is only that, 
and considerable expertise in planning and evaluation through cost benefit 
and other techniques will need to come in train if justice is to be done 
to any effective decision-making process. This version of the legal 
process will need to sunder the connections with a number of Anglo-Saxon 
legal traditions, not least in the administrative law sphere. Doctrines 
of standing are a positive impediment to the processes we are here 
outlining when what is needed is the release of a system's capacity to 
inform itself. The sharp distinction between law and politics, never, as 
we have argued, terribly convincing must give way not only to law as 
"surrogate political process" (Stewart 1976, 1761) but law as institution­
building for the better identification and construction and implementation 
of policy goals. Its relationship with "full-fledged social policy 




























































































Little of this is really new. The public interest lawyers in the USA 
in the 1970s were making very similar points, except that their focus was 
the capture of decision-making referents. Now clearly learning is less 
likely to be unalloyed if it is informed only by sectarian constituencies 
so that it was and remains wise to entertain "suspicion of corporate 
power, or more precisely, suspicion of corporate subversion of government 
power" (Lazarus 1974, 2). Most of the important developments in British 
public administration in recent times have taken place without the kind of 
guarantees of which we are speaking. Indeed, we repeat the alarm with 
which we view the absence of constitutional discussion concerning the ex 
parte problem.
Although exposing ex parte communications is notoriously difficult to 
guarantee through law it seems to us vital to make the effort, most 
particularly in a system which is riddled with institutional veins of 
familiarity. It is worth reminding British lawyers that the American 
Administrative Procedure Act obliges members of agencies to place on the 
record written communications, memoranda of oral submissions and other 
responses oral and written received from one party to the proceeding only.
Much administrative law reform since 1946 has represented an attempt to 
catch new variations of informal and improper pressures. It is surely 
time for British lawyers to address their minds to such matters within the 
heart of the governmental process.
Where then are we led? The central policy dilemmas confronting the 
British state need, in the light of expectations underlying our polity, to 
take place in an atmosphere characterised by the best information 
available from all interested parties. Our system does not currently 
encourage this. On the contrary, it discourages it. To inform thinking 




























































































faith in the tools of their trade and enough energy to chart movements in 
the nature of public and private power so that discourse through law 
became a fashionable creed.
We need to examine experiments in the field of 'loose' and 'soft' 
regulation and to monitor the effectiveness of oversight in the public 
interest. We need also to think about institutions which will be able to 
scrutinise the costs and benefits of alternative policies and programmes, 
not least to ask when self-regulatory techniques are worth pursuing and 
when not. All of this means institutionalising a "hard look" at tough 
choices. We are prepared to offer a variation of Sir Douglas Wass's 
standing Royal Commission as a beginning. A British Administrative 
Conference with teeth could start to chew on such a programme (Lewis and 
Harden 1984).
Much of the literature concerning legitimation and rationality crises, 
of the need for grounded or bounded rationality and institutional learning 
processes finds us an eager public. However, its theoretical attractions 
apart, the particular problems of the British State (see Ashford 1981 
especially) with its extraordinary concentrations of executive power, 
make it required and persistent reading. That it should focus on the 
empirical circumstances of current public dilemmas with a view to 
suggesting conceptual categories for legal institutions in the 1980s and 






















































































































































































American Bar Association (ABA) 1979. Federal regulation: roads to reform.
Ashford, D. E. 1981. Policy and politics in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell.
Atiyah, P. S. 1979. The rise and fall of freedom of contract. Oxford: Clarendon.
Austin, R. 1982. The Problem of legitimacy in the welfare state.
Pennsylvania Law Review, 130, 1510.
Baldwin, R. 1983. Regulation and discretionary justice, Regulation 
Conference Paper, Oxford.
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1984, Vol.24 pp.AO-53
Barker, A. 1982. Quangos in Britain. Hong Kong: MacMillan.
Beyleveld, D. and Brownsword, R. 1983. Law as a Moral Judgment vs Law as 
the Rules of the Powerful, 23 American Jo. of Jurisprudence.
Boyer, A. 1983. Form as Substance; A Comparison of Antitrust Regulations. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 32, 904.
Boyer, B. 1983. Fifty years of Regulatory Reform in the United States,
Paper to Conference on Regulation in Britain, Oxford.
Carson, W. 1982. The other price of Britain's oil. London: Martin Robertson.
Choper, J. 1980. Judicial review and the national political process.
Civil Aviation Authority 198A. CAP 500 Airline Competition Policy, CAA.
College of Health 1984. The nation's lifeline: on investigations into the 
relationship of the DHSS and BOC. , London College of Health.
Cooper, J. 1980. The Management and Regulation of Banks. London. MacMillan.
Dahl, R. A. and Lindblom, C. E. 1976. Politics, economics and welfare (2nd ed.) 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Daintith, T. 1984. The executive power today, in Jowell, J. (ed.) Essays 
in Constitutional Law. O.U.P.
Davies, K. 1983. Local government law. London: Butterworths.
Davis, K. C. 1958. Administrative law text.
Davis, K. C. 1971. Discretionary Justice. Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press.
Department of Trade, 1982. The Nationalised Industries Consumer Councils,
A Strategy for Reform.





























































































Fforde, J. S. Competition, innovation and regulation in British banking:
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin September 1983, 363-376.
Gewirth, A. 1978. Reason and Morality, Chicago.
Green, N. Crisis in the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 4 Business Law 
Review 1983.
Gower, L. C. B. 1984. Review of investor protection, report part 1 Cmnd. 9125
Habermas, J. 1979. Communication and the evolution of society. London: 
Heinemann.
\
Harlow, C. 1984. Commercial interdependence; public corporations and 
private industry, London: Institute of Policy Studies.
Harrison, M. 1984. Corporatism and the welfare state. London: Gower.
Harter, P. 1982. Negotiating regulations - A cure for malaise.
Georgetown L. J. 71, 1.
Heclo, J. and Wildavsky, A. 1981. The private government of public money. 
London: Macmillan.
HMSO 1978a, Nationalised Industries Cmnd. 7131.
HMSO 1978b, A review of monopolies and mergers policy: Cmnd. 7198.
HMSO 1982 First Annual Report of the Social Security Advisory Committee 
for 1980-81.
HMSO 1983a, The development of cable in systems and services, Cmnd.8866 
HMSO 1983b, Railway finances (The Serpell Report).
HMSO 1983c Second Annual Report of the Social Security Advisory Committee 
for 1982-3.
Holdsworth, Sir William 1938. A History of English Law. Volume XI.
London: Methuen.
Horwitz, M. J. 1977 The Transformation of American law 1780-1860, Harvard.
Horwitz, M. J. 1982. The history of the public/private distinction.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130, 1423-8.
Hunt, Sir Norman 1982. Report of the inquiry into cable expansion and 
broadcasting policy. Cmnd. 8679.
Jennings, Sir W. I., 1959. The Law of the Constitution (5th Edition)
London U.P.
Jessop, B. 1982. The capitalist state. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Korah, V. 1982. Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market.



























































































Lazarus, Simar (1974). The genteel populists. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart and Winston.
Lewis, N. 1975. IBA programme contract awards. Public Law 317.
Lewis, N. 1985. Who controls quangos and the nationalised industries? in 
Jowell, J. (ed), Essays in constitutional law. O.U.P.
Lewis, N. and Harden, I. J. 1983. Privatisation, de-regulation and 
constitutionality: some Anglo-American comparisons,
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 34, 207-229.
Lewis, N. and Harden I. J. 1984. Wass: the beginning of the end of v
orthodox fairy tales, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (Forthcoming).
Lewis, N. and Harden, I. J. 1985. The rule of law and the British Constitution. 
Hutchinson (forthcoming).
Lewis, N. 1981. Towards a sociology of lawyering in public administration, 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 32, 89.
Lehner, P. H. A. Judicial review of administrative action.
Columb. Law Rev. 83, 627-689.
Llewellyn, K. 1940. The normative, the legal and the law jobs.
Yale Law Jo. 49, 1355.
Middlemas, K. 1979. Politics in industrial society.
National Economic Development Office 1976. A study of U.K. nationalised 
industries H.M.S.O.
Nonet, P. and Selznick, P. 1978. Law and society in transition: toward 
responsive law.
Parker, R. 1981. The past of constitutional theory - and its future.
Ohio State Law Jo. 42, 22-3.
Pierce, R. J. and Shapiro, S. A. 1981. Political and judicial review of agency 
action. Texas Law Rev. 59, 1175.
Poggi, G. 1978. The development of the modern state. London: Hutchinson.
Redwood, J. and hatch, J. 1982. Controlling public industries. Blackwell.
Reich, N. 1983. The regulatory crisis: does it exist and can it be solved? 
Government and Policy 1984 vol.2, Pion.




























































































Self, P. E. 1972. Administrative theory and politics. London: Allen and Unwin.
Stewart, R. 1975. The reformation of American administrative law.
Harvard Law Review, 88, 1667-1813.
Stewart, R. & C.R. Sunstein. 1982. Public programs and private rights.
Harvard Law Review 95, 1193.
Teubner, G. 1983. Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law.
Law and Soc. Rev. 17, 239-285.
Trubek, D. M. 1977. Complexity and contradiction in the legal order:
Balbus and the challenge of critical social thought about law.
Law and Soc. Rev. 11, 529-569.
Unger, R. M. 1983. The critical legal studies movement. Harvard Law Rev. 96,561-675. 



























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European 
University Institute, Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge —  depending on the availability 
of stocks —  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 11/84
To :The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana


































































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
EUI WORKING PAPERS
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranationalism Revisited - 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Leonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future Prospects
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der 
national-sozialistischen Architektur
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction
10:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics




On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
13:Gunther TEUBNER Reflexive Rationalitaet des Rechts
14:Gunther TEUBNER Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
16:Ian BUDGE Democratic Party Government: Formation 
and Functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries
17:Hans DAALDER Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
Initial Mapping
18:Giuseppe DI PALMA Party Government and Democratic 
Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies
19:Richard S. KATZ Party Government: A Rationalistic 
Conception
20:Juerg STEINER Decision Process and Policy Outcome: 
An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level
21:Jens ALBER The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Empirical Evidence
22:Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory
23:Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in the 
Euro-Dollar Market
24:Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in 
the '20s and the '70s
25:Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
26:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - 
Prospects and Repercussions
27:Terence C. DAINTITH Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
28:Frank C. CASTLES/ 
Peter MAIR
Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
Expert Judgements
29:Karl HOHMANN The Ability of German Political 
Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: 
the Situation in 1982
30:Max KAASE The Concept of Political Culture: Its 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
31:Klaus TOEPFER Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Regional Economic Development Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany
32:Ronald INGLEHART The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages Among West European Elites 
and Publics
33:Moshe LISSAK Boundaries and Institutional Linkages 
Between Elites: Some Illustrations 
from Civil-Military Elites in Israel
34:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview
35:Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regulation
36:Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance 
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979
37:G. LOWELL FIELD/ 
John HIGLEY
The States of National Elites and the 
Stability of Political Institutions in 
81 Nations, 1950-1982
38:Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political 
System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of 
Consensus?
39:Edward 0. LAUMANN/ 
David KNOKE
A Framework for Concatenated Event 
Analysis
40:Gwen MOOR/
Richard D . ALBA
Class and Prestige Origins in the 
American Elite
41:Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies 
in the Irish republic, 1948-1981: The 
Evidence of Manifestos
42:Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine 
State. The Art of the Impossible and 
the Possible
43:Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural 




Zur Implementation von 
Gerichtsurteilen. Hypothesen zu den 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
45:Alexis PAULY/ 
René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties
46:Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis for 
Strike Patterns in Europe?
47-.Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48 :J .P. FITOUSSI/ 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de 
la Durée du Travail
49:Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit 
Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit 
International
50:Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei 
Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e 
Divieti di Discriminazione nella 
Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in Materia 
di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e 
Professionale dei Lavoratori
51:Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsability as a Problem 
of Company Constitution
52:Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic 
Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
53:Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of 
Italian Legislators. A Contribution of 
the Understanding of a Polarized 
System
54:Mattei DOGAN How to become a Cabinet Minister in 
Italy: Unwritten Rules of the 
Political Game
55:Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
Narciso PIZARRO




Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economic Policy
57:Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the 
Prospect for Party Government
59:Christopher Hill/ 
James MAYALL





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
60:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
61:Philippe LEFORT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la 
Famille dans le Ménager de Paris et le 
Second Libro di Famiglia, de L.B. 
Alberti
62:Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren
63:Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI Law and Social Conflict
64:Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s
65:Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some 
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a 
Custom Union
66:Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control : The 
Deutschemark Case




The Effects of Worker Participation 




On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences : A Contribution to the 
Frischian Scheme
70:Werner MAIHOFER Politique et Morale
71:Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: 
Comparison with Southern France
72:Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
73:Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the Modern State
74:Philippe SCHMITTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist 
Practice





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
76 rRichard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the 
Netherlands and its International 
Consequences, May 1945 - March 1951
77:Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British 
Policy towards European Integration
78:Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in 
1947?
79:Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: How a 
Transistory Experiment answered to 
Deep-Rooted Needs
80:Werner ABELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
81:Helge PHARO The Domestic and International 
Implications of Norwegian 
Reconstruction
82:Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951
83:Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 
1947-1952
84:Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economie Policy in the 
Italian Reconstruction
85:William DIEBOLD, Jr. Trade and Payments in Western Europe 
in Historical Perspective: A Personal 
View by an Interested Party
86:Frances LYNCH French Reconstruction in a European 
Context
87:Gunther TEUBNER Verrechtlichung. Begriffe, Merkmale, 
Grenzen, Auswege
88:Maria SPINEDI Les Crimes Internationaux de l'Etat 
dans les Travaux de Codification de la 
Responsabilité des Etats Entrepris par 
les Nations Unies
89:Jelle VISSER Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar 
Western Europe
90:Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and 
Industrialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1977




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
92:Elisabeth DE GHELLINCK/ 
Paul A. GEROSKI/
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 









Community, Market, State- and 
Associations. The Prospective 
Contribution of Interest Governance 
to Social Order
95:Nigel GRIFFIN "Virtue Versus Letters": The Society 
of Jesus 1550-1580 and the Export of 
an Idea
96:Andreas KUNZ Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Arbeitskonflikte im oeffentlichen 
Sektor. Deutschland und 
Grossbritannien im Vergleich 1914-1924
97:Wolfgang STREECK Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations 
and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany
98:Simon A. HORNER The Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands - A Study of their Status 
under Constitutional, International 
and European Law
99:Daniel ROCHE Le Monde des Ombres
84/100:Gunther TEUBNER After Legal Instrumentalism?
84/101:Patrick NERHOT Contribution aux Débats sur le Droit 
Subjectif et le Droit Objectif comme 
Sources du Droit
84/102:Jelle VISSER The Position of Central Confederations 
in the National Union Movements
84/103:Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in the 
Inter-War Period
84/104:M. Rainer LEPSIUS Sociology in Germany and Austria 1918- 
1945. The Emigration of the Social 
Sciences and its Consequences. The 
Development of Sociology in Germany 




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
84/105:Derek JONES The Economic Performances of Producer 
Cooperations within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/106:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Neo-Corporatism and the State
84/107:Marcos BUSER Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsverbaende 
auf Gesetzgebungsprozesse und das 
Vollzugswesen im Bereich des 
Umweltschutzes
84/108:Frans van WAARDEN Bureaucracy around the State:Varieties 
of Collective Self-Regulation in the 
Dutch Dairy Industry
84/109:Ruggero RANIERI The Italian Iron and Steel Industry 
and European Integration




A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations in 
Output in a Mixed Economy
84/112:Anna Elisabetta GALEOTTI Individualism and Political Theory
84/113:Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114:Saul ESTRIN/Jan SVEJNAR Explanations of Earnings in 
Yugoslavia: The Capital and Labor 
Schools Compared
84/115:Alan CAWSON/John BALLARD A Bibliography of Corporatism
84/116:Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed 
Preference Without Demand Continuity 
Assumptions
84/117:Richard T.GRIFFITHS/Frances The FRITALUX/FINEBEL Negotiations
M.B. LYNCH 1949/1950
84/118:Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and 
Involuntary Unemployment
84/119:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects; General 
Principles and E.C. Procedures




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
84/121tMarcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122:Marcello DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development: 




Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
84/124:John FARQUHARSON The Management of Agriculture and 
Food Supplies in Germany, 1944-47
84/125:Ian HARDEN/Norman LEWIS De-Legalisation in Britain in the 
1980s
84/126:John CABLE Employee Participation and Firm 
Performance. A Prisoners' Dilemma 
Framework
84/127:Jesper JESPERSEN Financial Model Building and 
Financial Multipliers of the 
Danish Economy
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
